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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
RULON ROMRELL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
W. W. CLYDE & COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant. J

Case No.
13801

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Notwithstanding the fact the Appellant-Contractor,
W. W. Clyde, cut a drainage ditch under a fence, which
it had also constructed, in accordance with the plans
and specifications of its contract with the State of Utah,
and in the presence of the State Inspector, who approved
the work, Respondent, Rulon Romrell, alleged that Appellant-Contractor, W. W. Clyde, negligently undermined
a fence "which surrounded an area where his Charlois
bull and Hereford cow were located, and as a result the
animals were able to crawl under the fence" where it was
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"undermined" and said animals got into a pasture of
alfalfa where they bloated and died (Plaintiff's Complaint).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury in the District Court
of Utah County with the Honorable J. Robert Bullock
presiding. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
Plaintiff-Respondent and against the Appellant-Contractor on the Second Cause of Action in the sum of One
Thousand Nine Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($1,900.00),
together with costs in the sum of Ninety-five and 80/100
Dollars ($95.80), and Judgment was entered accordingly.
The First Cause of Action, claiming damage of Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) for the loss of a Hereford cow
which is not the subject of this appeal, was dismissed by
jury, no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment entered
below by the trial court with respect to the Second Cause
of Action for One Thousand Nine Hundred and No/100
($1,900.00), plus coats.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant is a corporation engaged in the construction business. Respondent is an individual engaged in
farming and a small cattle operation.
On August 22, 1972, Respondent alleges that his
Charlois bull, valued at One Thousand Five Hundred and
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No/100 Dollars ($1,500.00) and his Hereford cow, valued
at Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00), crawled under a
fence, which was installed by agents of the Appellant
(a subcontractor) at a location where Appellant had
"undermined" the fence, and got into an alfalfa field
where they bloated and died.
The construction of the fence and drainage ditch
under the fence at the point where the Charlois bull and
the Hereford caw allegedly got out was part of a construction project entitled "Bluffdale Road to Alpine"
which was opened for bid by the State of Utah on April
27, 1971 (Tr. 61 - p. 2, lines 22-25), and on which the
Appellant, who was awarded the project, commenced
work on May 21, 1971 (Tr. 61 - p. 3, lines 12-16). The
entire construction project had not been completed at
the time of trial on May 31, 1974, and the State Inspector, Clifford Corless, testified that his "final inspection",
which occurs when the project is completed, would be
"some time to come" in the future (Tr. 61 - p. 43, lines
1230 and p. 44, lines 1-10). Obviously, however, there
were many parts of the project which had been completed,
in and of themselves, although the entire project had not
been completed.
The "undermining" of the fence, alleged by Respondent, concerned a drainage ditch which was in fact dug
at Station 143 by an agent of Appellant (subcontractor)
in the presence of an employee of Appellant and the
State Inspector, Clifford Corless, on May 22, 1972 (Tr.
61 - p. 36, line 30 and p. 37, lines 1-8). The Project En-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
gineer, Phillip Lundell, testified that the drainage ditch
was in the State's original plans and specifications (Tr.
61 - p. 14, lines 29-30 and p. 15, lines 1-6). The State,
through its agents, staked the drainage ditch on May 4,
1972, directed the Appellant-Contractor to cut it under
the fence, and the work was done on May 22, 1972, in
the presence of the State Inspector, Clifford Corless (Tr.
61 - p. 15, lines 17-20). Corless testified that the drainage
ditch was cut in accordance with the State's plans and
and specifications and that the work was completed in
his presence on May 22, 1972 (Tr. 61 - p. 36, line 30 and
p. 37, lines 1-8), which was three months before the
Respondent's bull and cow allegedly got under the fence
through the drainage ditch on August 22, 1972.
In regard to the fence at Station 143 where the drainage ditch was cut, Clifford Corless, the State Inspector,
testified that based on his own personal observation on
May 22, 1972, the fence was constructed in accordance
with the plans and specifications of the State, that no
damage had been done to the fence in digging the drainage ditch and that the work on the fence was complete
as of that date, May 22, 1972 (Tr. 61 - p. 33, lines 6-30
and p. 34, lines 1-2).
Actually, the fence at Station 143 was part of some
3,600 feet of fence which had been constructed by an
agent of the Appellant-Contractor (subcontractor) which,
according to Phillip Lundell, the Project Engineer, had
been completed since the fall of 1971, about one year
prior to the incident concerning the Respondent's bull
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and cow on August 22, 19727 (Tr. 61 - p. 9, lines 17-30
and p. 10, line 13). The Appellant-Contractor did not
perform any more work on the fence after the fall of
1971 (Tr. 61 - p. 14, lines 14-16) since the work was completed as was confirmed by the State Inspector, Clifford
Corless, when he observed the digging of the drainage
ditch on May 22, 1972.
After May 22, 1972, there apparently was some erosion in the area where the drainage ditch was cut under
the fence such that on August 22,1972, some three months
after the Appellant-Contractor had completed its work on
the drainage ditch in the presence of and under the direction of the State Inspector, Clifford Corless, who accepted the work as having been done in accordance with
the plans and specifications of the State of Utah, the
Plaintiff-Respondent's Charlois bull and Hereford cow
allegedly got under the fence and went into an alfalfa
field where they bloated and died.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE APPELLANT-CONTRACTOR WAS NOT NEGLIGENT BECAUSE THE WORK WAS DONE
BY THE APPELLANT-CONTRACTOR IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLANS AND
SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE WORK AS
PROVIDED BY THE STATE OF UTAH.
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POINT II.
EVEN IF THE COURT DETERMINED
THAT THERE WAS A JURY QUESTION
AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANT-CONTRACTOR MAY HAVE BEEN
NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO FOLLOW
THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, THE COURT
ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THERE HAD BEEN
A PRACTICAL ACCEPTANCE BY THE
STATE OF UTAH OF THE WORK DONE
BY THE APPELLANT-CONTRACTOR
WHICH SHIFTS THE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR MAINTAINING THE WORK FROM
THE APPELLANT-CONTRACTOR TO THE
STATE OF UTAH AND MAKES THE STATE
OF UTAH LIABLE TO THIRD PARTIES
SUCH AS PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT FOR
ANY INJURIES OR DAMAGE SUFFERED
BY REASON OF THE WORK.
The law in the subject case is clear but its application depends on whether or not the work performed by
the contractor was negligently done.
(1) If the contractor was not negligent in performing the work, then the law is that a contractor is not
liable to a third person receiving injury or damage where
the contractor has performed the work in accordance

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
with the plans and specifications. Black v. Peter Kiewit
Sons', Inc., 94 Ida. 755, 497 P. 2d (1972), (Court stated
"This general rule is applicable in Idaho where this court
has held that if a contractor performs his work according
to the plans and specifications, no liability may be imposed upon him for any damage resulting from such construction"). See 13 A. L. R. 2d 195 and 58 A. L. R. 2d
869 for a compilation of cases in support of this rule of
law.
(2) If the contractor was negligent in performing
the work, then the law is that a contractor is not liable
to a third person receiving injury or damage as a result
of the negligent construction of the work, after completion and acceptance thereof by the owner or contractee
(the State in the case at bar) and such law does not
require a formal acceptance of the contractor's work since
liability of the contractor ceases with a practical acceptance after completion. Black v. Peter Kiewit Sons', Inc.,
supra. See 13 A. L. R. 2d 195 at 211 to 212 and 58 A. L.
R. 2d 869 at 876 to 878 and supplements thereto for a
compilation of cases in support of this rule of law.
The first matter the Court must consider is what
questions it is supposed to determine in a negligence
action. The Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts,
§ 328 B, expressly states that:
"In an action for negligence the court determines: (a) whether the evidence as to the facts
makes an issue upon which the jury may reasonably find the existence or non-existence of
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such facts; and (b) whether such facts give rise
to any legal duty on the part of the defendant;
• ••

Therefore, assuming for the moment that there are
factual issues, the court must determine whether such
facts, assuming they are resolved in favor of the plaintiff,
give rise to a legal duty on the part of the defendant
contractor.
In the typical automobile accident case, the court
determines that the driver of a motor vehicle has a duty
of due care toward all persons who may be injured or
damaged by the use of such motor vehicle from the time
the driver commences use of such motor vehicle until the
time such use comes to an end or the drive is completed.
In the case at bar then, the court must detetrmine when
the duty of the contractor to third persons begins and
when such duty ends. It is submitted that based upon
the above, the contractor's duty to third persons begins
when the contractor commences the construction work
and it ends when the work is satisfactorily completed or
when there is a practical acceptance of the work.
Now, in the case at bar, as in a typical automobile
accident case, the Plaintiff-Respondent has the burden
of placing into evidence facts which are sufficient to give
rise to a legal duty owed by the Appellant-Contractor
to the Plaintiff-Respondent, a third party. In order to
do so, Plaintiff-Respondent must introduce facts which
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Appellant-Contractor was negligent and that, at the time
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of Plaintiff-Respondent's damage, the Appellant-Contractor was still in charge and control of the work and
that the work itself had not been satisfactorily completed, turned over to or accepted by the State. In other
words, even if the Plaintiff-Respondent's evidence is sufficient to show that the Appellant-Contractor was negligent in performing the work, the Plaintiff-Respondent
must also have evidence sufficient to show that there
had not been a satisfactory completion or practical acceptance of the work by the State because at the point
where there is a satisfactory completion or practical acceptance of the work by the State, the Appellant-Contractor's duty to third persons ceases and the State's
duty to the third persons begins. The Court must determine whether or not there is sufficient evidence in
the record to meet Plaintiff-Respondent's burden.
Before going to the record, however, the following
three cases should be noted which support the above
recitation of the function of the court and the burden
of the plaintiff.
In Haynes v. Norfolk Bridge and Construction Company, 126 Neb. 281, 253 N. W. 344 (1934), where defendant contractor had completed its work on a highway
for the State, prior to the accident, and did no further
work therafter on the area where the accident occurred
and there was no further work for the contractor to do,
the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that the burden was
upon the plaintiff to establish that the contractor was
yet in charge and control of the work at the time of the
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accident, and, having failed in this regard, there was no
evidence that would warrant submitting the question
to the jury.
In Rengstorf v. Winston Bros. Co., 167 Minn. 290,
208 N. W. 995 (1926), the court held that there was
nothing in that case to impose a duty upon the defendant [a grading contmctor] to place guard rails along
both sides of a road or to illuminate it. "To hold otherwise," the opinion reads, "we would have to say that a
jury might properly place upon a grading contractor,
where the controlling authority of the State has subjected
has completed work to public use, after its satisfactory
completion, but before its formal acceptance, responsibility for failure to illuminate and equip it with guard
rails. The result is impossible."
In Reynolds v. Manley, 223 Ark. 314, 265 S. W. 2d
714 (1954), the court held that the contractor was not
liable to a third party injured as a result of certain work
performed by the contractor where the state highway
department was present when the construction work
was being done, that it not only knew how it was being
done, but actually directed what materials to use and it
approved and accepted the work with full knowledge.
Now, keeping in mind that the Court must determine whether or not Plaintiff-Respondent has met his
burden of showing that the Appellant-Contractor was
negligent in performing the work and that the AppellantContractor was still in charge and control of the work
at the time Plaintiff-Respondent suffered damages on
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August 22, 1972, and that there had not been a satisfactory completion or practical acceptance of the work
by the State, let us go to the record to see what the facts
really show. The record submitted is that of the two
State officials, Phillip Lundell, the Project Engineer,
and Clifford Coriess, the State Inspector, both of whom
testified concerning the Appellant-Contractor's work and
specifically as to whether or not it had been done in
accordance with the plans and specifications and whether
or not the Appellant-Contractor was still in charge and
control of the work and whether or not the work had
been satisfactorily completed, turned over to and accepted (practically, not formally) by the State. There
are no other witnesses who could better testify as to
these facts since it is the State to whom the duty to
third persons shifts upon satisfactory completion or practical acceptance of the work.
The work in question consists of a fence and a drainage ditch cut underneath the fence. According to the
testimony of Phillip Lundell, the Project Engineer, (Tr.
61 - p. 1, lines 26-29 and p. 2, lines 7-12) the AppellantContractor installed a fence from Station 149 to Station
133 + 50 on June 1, 1971 (Tr. 61 - p. 6, lines 8-9). The
distance from one Station to another is 100 feet (Tr. 61
- p. 5, lines 16-17). Therefore, from Station 149 to Station 133 + 50 would be about 1,650 feet. About a week
after June 12, 1971, the fence was continued up to Station 114, or an additional 1,950 feet (Tr. 61 - p. 7, lines
24-29). All of this fencing, approximately 3,600 feet, was
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completed by early fall of 1971 (Tr. 61 - p. 9, lines 17-30
and p. 10, line 13). The Appellant-Contractor did not
perform any more work on the fence after the fall of 1971
(Tr. 61 - p. 14, lines 14-16). As far as the fence is concerned then, it was completed in the early fall; the posts
had been cemented and the fence had been tied down
both along the level ground and in the washes; and there
was nothing left for the Appellant-Contractor to do on
the fence. It had been satisfactorily completed.
The particular part of the work which allegedly
caused damage to Plaintiff-Respondent by reason of his
bull and cow getting out on August 22, 1972, was at Station 143 where a drainage ditch had been cut under the
fence. According to the books and records of the State,
which are kept in the normal course of business (Tr. 61
- p. 27, line 30 and p. 28, lines 1-4), and according to Mr.
Limdell, the Project Engineer, and to Clifford Corless,
the State Inspector (Tr. 61 - p. 29, lines 15-16) who was
there when the drainage ditch was cut, the work was
staked on May 4, 1972, and the work was done on May
22,1972 (Tr. 61 - p. 15, lines 12-20 and p. 31, lines 10-25).
Lundell testified that the drainage ditch was in the
State's original plans and specifications (Tr. 61 - p. 14,
lines 29-30 and p. 15, lines 1-6). The State planned to
build the drainage ditch from the outset, since it was
in its original plans, and the State directed the AppellantContractor to build it (Tr. 61 - p. 15, lines 7-10). The
State staked the drainage ditch on May 4, 1972, and the
work was done on May 22, 1972, in the presence of the
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State Inspector, Clifford Corless (Tr. 61 - p. 15, lines
11-20) Lundell testified that the drainage ditch should
have been completed on May 22, 1972 (Tr. 61 - p. 15,
lines 21-25). Corless confirmed that the drainage ditch
was in fact, satisfactorily completed on May 22,1972 (Tr.
61 - p, 36, line 30 and p. 37, lines 1-8).
In regard to the fence, Corless, the State Inspector,
testified that based upon his own personal observation
on May 22, 1972, three months prior to August 22, 1972,
the work on the fence, located at Station 143, where the
drainage ditch was cut, was constructed in accordance
with the plans and specifications of the State (Tr. 61 p. 33, lines 6-30 and p. 34, lines 1-2), i.e., the wire used
by the Appellant-Contractor was the same specification
(Tr. 61 - p. 33, lines 6-9), and the wire was tied down
at the top and the bottom and every other strand, which
was the same specification as called for by the State (Tr.
61, - p. 33, lines 25-30 and p. 34, lines 1-2). Corless further testified that at the time the ditch was dug on May
22, 1972, he paid particular attention to the AppellantContractor's work to make sure that the fence was not
damaged. He confirmed that the fence was not damaged
at all (Tr. 61 - p. 31, lines 26-30 and p. 32, lines 1-9). In
conclusion, Corless testified, concerning the fence (Tr.
61, - p. 36, lines 24-29), as follows:
Q. Okay. Down here, (indicating) at Station 143, when you were there on May 22, 1972,
observing the digging of the ditch, was the fence
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at that particular station complete or was there
something else that the contractor had to do?
A. In that area, it was complete.
There is absolutely no evidence that the AppellantContractor was negligent, as far as the State was concerned, since the Appellant-Contractor constructed the
fence in accordance with the plans and specifications of
the State. Even if the Appellant-Contractor was negligent, which Appellant-Contractor strongly denies, as far
as the State was concerned, the work on the fence had
been satisfetctorily completed in accordance with the plans
and specifications of the State and, therefore, any liability to third persons concerning the fence shifted to
the State upon such satisfactory completion, which Appellant-Contractor submits was also a practical acceptance
of the work on the fence.
In regard to the drainage ditch, Corless, the State
Inspector, testified that the State had staked the drainage ditch on May 4, 1972, and that the Appellant Contractor performed the work of digging the ditch in accordlance with how it was staked on May 22, 1972 (Tr.
61 - p. 31, lines 10-25). In conclusion, Mr. Corless testified, concerning the ditch (Tr. 61 - p. 36, line 30 and
p. 37, lines 1-8), as follows:
Q. Okay. Now, with respect to the digging
of the ditch and the laying of the pipe, when
was that completed?
A. It was completed on the 22nd.
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Q. Of May?
A. It was completed on five 22, of 72; the
pipe installation.
Q. And was there anything left for the
contractor to do after that date with respect to
the ditch and the pipe?
A. Not in my judgment.
There is absolutely no evidence that the AppellantContractor was negligent in the manner in which it dug
the ditch since it was dug in accordance with the plans
and specifications of the State. Mr. Corless was there
to make sure that the ditch was dug as the State wanted
it dug and in accordance with the plans and specifications
of the State. Even if the Appellant-Contractor was negligent, which Appellant-Contractor strongly denies, as far
as the State was concerned, the work on the ditch had
been satisfactorily completed in accordance with the plans
and specifications of the State and, therefore, any liability to third persons concerning the ditch shifted to the
State upon such satisfactory completion, which Appellant-Contractor submits was also a practical acceptance
of the work on the ditch.
On cross-examination, Mr. Corless testified that he
measured the ditch because the State has to pay the
Appellant-Contractor by the cubic yard and, further, that
nothing was placed under the fence after the ditch was
dug because "at the time (May 22, 1972) there was no
reason to" (Tr. 61 - p. 40, lines 3-10). The ditch was dug
by the Appellant-Contractor as the State directed it
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should be dug. The Appellant-Contractor merely followed the directions of the State Inspector. The Appellant-Contractor did what a reasonably prudent person
would have doneunder the same or similar circumstances.
There was no improper workmanship or failure to perform. In Black v. Peter Kiewit Sons', Inc., supra, the
Idaho Supreme Court stated the law in this regard, as
follows:
"A contractor is required to follow the plans and
specifications and when he does so, he cannot
be held to guarantee that the work performed
as required by his contract will be free from defects, or withstand the action of the elements,
or that the completed job will accomplish the
purpose intended. He is only responsible for improper workmanship or other faults, or defects
resulting from his failure to perform."
Thus, if the ditch had eroded away and become much
deeper, as alleged by Plaintiff-Respondent, the AppellantContractor cannot be held responsible because when he
follows the State's directions (plans and specifications),
he cannot be held to guarantee that the work will be free
from defects or withstand the action of the elements or
that the completed job will accomplish the purpose intended.
On further cross-examination, Mr. Corless testified
concerning formal acceptance of the fence (Tr. 61 - p.
43, lines 12-30 and p. 44, lines 1-10), as follows:
Q. Did you ever make a formal acceptance
of this fence?
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A. Haven't done as of yet.
Q. And in fact the freeway wasn't completed until when?
A. It isn't completed at the present time.
Q. And did you ever make any acceptance
of the fence at all?
A. No, sir.
Q. And would that be one of your responsibilities?
A. No. That, sir, is the responsibility of
the project engineer. And I advised him of the
situation in the field.
Q. And he relies upon your advice, is that
right?
A. Not entirely. There's other people involved.
Q. And as far as you're concerned you've
never advised them to accept that fence or any
part of it as yet, is that right?
A. Well, the job's never been finaled out,
and we never accept anything totally until the
job's completed.
Q. And when the job's completed then
you accept it?
A. That's right. Then we'll go through on
a final inspection. And that is sometime to
come.
Q. And you haven't inspected it finally as
yet?
A. Not the final acceptance. No, sir.
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Q. That includes the fence, is that right?
A. That's the project as a whole.
Q. I say, that includes the fence, does it
not?
A. Yes.
It should be noted that the acceptance referred to
above it a "formal acceptance" which is made upon "final
inspection of the whole project" when it is completed
which Corless said would be some time to come. The
kind of acceptance Corless testified to above is what the
courts have referred to as a "formal acceptance" which
is not required in order to relieve a contractor from liability to third persons and shift it to the owner or the
State. The only acceptance necessary, as previously
stated in the case law, is a practical acceptance (or, we
submit, satisfactory completion) of the work in question
which allegedly causes the injury or damage. Surely, as
stated in Rengstorf v. Winston Bros. Co., supra, where
injury or damage occurs after "satisfactory completion"
of the work by the contractor but before formal acceptance of the work by the state, to impose a duty upon a
contractor to continue supervision and care over such
work when the State has subjected it to use would impose an "impossible result" and an unconscionable burden on a contractor.
The Utah Supreme Court, in affirming a summary
judgment granted to a defendant contractor, has stated
that it "is familiar with the general rule as to the non-
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liability of an independent contractor after acceptance
of the work by the owner, as well as with the exceptions
to this rule and the so-called 'modern view', 13 A. L. R.
2d 195; 58 A. L. R. 2d 869." [Leininger v. Stearns-Roger
Manufacturing Company, 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P. 2d 33
(1965)].
In Leininger, the Supreme Court held that defendant contractor was not liable for injuries sustained in
an explosion of a fan installed by the contractor according to the directions of the owner and as received from
the manufacturer. If the court had applied the general
rule, as stated above, to the facts of the case, there would
have been no question as to the non-liability of the contractor. However, the court went even further and considered the injured plaintiff's claim under the "modern
view", the most liberal approach to holding contractors
liable, and still found that the contractor was not liable.
The court stated:
"The so-called modern view has the effect of
applying the landmark standard promulgated in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N. Y.
382, 111 N. E. 1050, L. R. A. 1916F, 696, but does
not have the effect of making a contractor absolutely liable to third persons if the contractor
was free of negligence. An important limitation
on the rule placing building contractors on the
same footing as sellers of goods is that the contractor is not liable if he has merely carried out
the plans, specifications and directions given
him, since in that case the responsibility is assumed by the employer, at least when the plans
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are not so obviously dangerous that no reasonable man would follow them."
The Leininger case is distinguishable from the case
at bar in that the Utah court stated that:
"The instant case is not one of the contractee
accepting an instrumentality constructed or repaired by the contractor according to a plan or
design furnished by the contractee to the contractor."
The case at bar is just such a case and application of the
general rule, as opposed to the modem view, seems more
appropriate.
Based upon a review of the above testimony, certain
essential facts are clear:
(1) As far as the State was concerned, the fence
in question, whether the 1,650 foot segment or the entire
3,600 foot segment, was satisfactorily completed in the
early fall of 1971, almost one year prior to August 22,
1972. The Appellant-Contractor built the fence in accordance with the plans and specifications of the State.
There was nothing left for the Appellant-Contractor to
do on the fence after the early fall of 1971, and the Appellant-Contractor removed his equipment and was no
longer in charge or control of the fence after the early
fall of 1971. The fence was turned over to the State in
the early fall of 1971 and no further work was done on
the fence nor did the State request the Appellant-Con-
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tractor to do any further work on the fence since that
time.
(2) As far as the State was concerned, the ditch
in question was satisfactorily completed no May 22, 1972,
three months prior to August 22, 1972. The AppellantContractor dug the ditch, in the presence of the State
Inspector, as it was staked and in accordance with the
plans and specifications as it was directed to do by the
State. There was nothing left for the Appellant-Contractor to do on the ditch after May 22, 1972, and the
Appellant-Contractor removed his equipment and was no
longer in charge or control of the ditch after May 22,
1972. The ditch was turned over to the State on May
22, 1972, and no further work was done on the ditch nor
did the State request the Appellant-Contractor to do
any further work on the ditch since that time.
Based upon the above facts, it is clear that PlaintiffRespondent has not met his burden of showing (1) that
the Appellant-Contractor was negligent (as far as the
State was concerned the Appellant-Contractor performed
the work in accordance with the plans and specifications)
and (2) that the Appellant-Contractor was still in charge
and control of the work on August 22, 1972, and that
there had not been a satisfactory completion or practical
acceptance of the work by the State.
Therefore, since the Plaintiff-Respondent failed to
meet his burden, it is submitted that the trial court
should have determined that Appellant-Contractor was
not negligent — he did not fail to do what a reasonably
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prudent man would have done in the same or similar
circumstances — he merely followed the directions of
the State and performed his work in accordance with the
State's plans and specifications.
Assuming for purposes of argument only that Appellant-Contractor was negligent in performing his work,
which Appellant-Contractor strongly denies, even then,
it is respectfully submitted that the trial court should
have determined that Appellant-Contractor's duty to
Plaintiff-Respondent, a third person, ended and shifted
to the State, as far as the fence is concerned, upon satisfactory completion in the early fall of 1971, almost a
year prior to August 22, 1972, and as far as the ditch is
concerned, ended and shifted to the State upon satisfactory completion on May 22, 1972, three months prior
to August 22, 1972. Thus, on August 22, 1972, when
the bull and cow allegedly got out under the fence
through the ditch, Appellant-Contractor owed no duty
to the Plaintiff-Respondent, a third person. The duty,
from the time of satisfactory completion, rested upon
the State.
To have allowed this case to go to the jury on the
above facts allowed the jury to impose an unconscionable
burden on the Appellant-Contractor and cause an impossible result (i.e., even though the Appellant-Contractor had completed its work exactly as the State wanted
it done and even though the State had accepted that
work, the jury was allowed to impose a continuing duty
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on the Appellant-Contractor to remain responsible for
the work).
Therefore, as set forth in the Restatement of the
Law, Second, Torts, § 328B, when the court determines
whether there are facts sufficient to give rise to a legal
duty on the part of the Appellant-Contractor, we submit
that the trial court should have determined (1) that
there was no negligence on the part of the AppellantContractor and, hence, no duty; and ()2 that even if
there was negligence, a conclusion which the facts do
not support, the Appellant-Contractor's duty to third
persons suffering injury or damages because of its work
ended and shifted to the State upon satisfactory completion or practical acceptance of the work which, as far
as the State was concerned, the entity to whom the duty
shifts, the duty should have shifted in early fall of 1971
on the fence and May 22, 1972, on the ditch, both of
which were long before August 22, 1972, the date on
which Plaintiff-Respondent allegedly suffered damage or
injury because of the work on the fence and ditch.
It is further submitted that when the trial court
determined whether the evidence as to the facte made
an issue upon which a jury may reasonably find the existence or non-existence of such facts, which determination is not necessary if the above question concerning
duty is determined as set forth above, the trial court
should have concluded that there were no such facts
since the facts set forth above in the testimony of the
two State officials is ^incontroverted (1) insofar as the
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Appellant-Contractor following the plans and specifications of the State is concerned, and (2) insofar as the
dates of satisfactory completion by the Appellant-Contractor or practical acceptance by the State is concerned.
It is submitted that based upon the above facts and
law, this case should have been decided by the court as
a matter of law in favor of the Appellant-Contractor and
against the Plaintiff-Respondent by reason of the fact
that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a jury
verdict and because such a jury verdict would be and.
was contrary to law.
At some point, the contractor's liability to third persons must end. Whether one wishes to view the matter
from a policy standpoint or talk in terms of "proximate
cause" and foreseeability", the result is the same.
Approached from a policy standpoint, it seems logical
to relieve the contractor of liability at that point where
he is no longer in practical control of the physical object
in question, providing no hidden defects are present. It
seems even more logical that where the contractor merely
follows plans and specifications furnished him by the
State, and over which he can exercise no discretion whatever, that his liability to third persons, would be not only
remote, but non-existent.
If the circumstances of the case are analyzed from
the standpoint of causation, it seems equally clear that
defendant's conduct was not the legal cause of the plaintiff's damage. Where the contractor merely followed the
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plans and specifications of the State, and a State Inspector stood by while the work was being performed, the
proximate cause of the injury would be more logically
attributable to defects in the plans and specifications
themselves. Neither was it foreseeable to the contractor,
who acted prudently and reasonably, that his performance of the work in accordance with those plans would
be the cause of the injury complained of in this instance.
To say that Appellant-Contractor, W. W. Clyde &
Company, remained liable for work satisfactorily completed and subsequently inspected by the State and
accepted as complete, would be to impose an impossible
burden on the contractor of "policing" all prior work done
in conjimction with the State for an indefinite number
of years to follow. As a matter of law, the contractor
should not be held to such an impossible standard of
care.
POINT III.

EVEN IF THE COURT DETERMINED
THAT THERE WAS A JURY QUESTION
AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANT-CONTRACTOR MAY HAVE BEEN
NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO FOLLOW THE
PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS OF THE
STATE OF UTAH AND EVEN IF THE
COURT DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS
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A JURY QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR
NOT THERE HAD BEEN A PRACTICAL
ACCEPTANCE BY THE STATE OF UTAH
OF THE A P P E L L A N T - C O N T R A C T O R ' S
WORK IN THE AREA IN QUESTION, THE
C O U R T ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES A PRACTICAL ACCEPTANCE.
After both parties had rested their cases, counsel
for the Appellant-Contractor made a Motion for a Directed Verdict and requested the opportunity to present
the law and argue the same before considering the court's
instmctions and before submission of the case to the
jury. The court, in chambers, advised counsel for the
Appellant-Contractor that no matter what the law was,
the court would take the Motion for a Directed Verdict
under advisement and submit the case to the jury. The
court then provided counsel with its instructions. Counsel for Appellant-Contractor prevailed upon the court
to at least add to Instru<ction No. 10 on the law that "the
acceptance need not be a formal acceptance, but a practical acceptance is sufficient" (Tr. 46). The court refused to hear any argument from counsel as to the need
to define what is meant by a "practical acceptance" nor
to even be informed as to the law in this area, prior to
instructing the jury.
After the court had instructed the jury and the jury
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had retired to deliberate on the matter, the court made
the following statement:
"The Court: All right, Mr. Morgan, you indicated that you wanted to make a motion, and
you in the presence of opposing counsel stated
to the court the nature of that motion, and the
court said that it would under any circumstances
take that motion under advisement. But I want
to give you an opportunity now to make the
motion formally. We'll consider as though you
made it prior to the time that the jury was instructed. And make what record you care to
with respect to it" (Tr. 63 - p. 1, lines 22-30).
[Emphasis added.]
"Mr. Morgan: Would the Court hear me out
on the law then at this time as well, or would
the Court prefer that I —
The Court: Well, we don't need an extended
argument with regard to it, but / will before I
rule on it ultimately hear you out on the law"
(Tr. 63 - p. 2, lines 1-6). [Emphasis added.]
Thereafter, counsel for the Appellant-Contractor informed the court as to the law in this area of "practical
acceptance" by citing some of the cases as set forth in
58 A. L. R. 2d 876-878 and 13 A. L. R. 2d 211-212 (Tr.
63 - pp. 2-4) after which the court made the following
statement:
"The Court: It may be a haw matter rather than
a jury question. We have made it a jury question, and we didn't tell them what 'practical ac-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28
ceptanee' means. And frankly I don't know
what it means.
The Court: And if the lawyers and the judges
and the Supreme Court can't tell what a practical
acceptance is, how is this jury going to do it?"
(TV. 63 - p. 4, lines 21-24, 29-30 and p. 5, line
1). [Emphasis added.]
It is apparent from the above that the court, after
having been informed as to the law (which it refused
to hear before instructing the jury), finally realized that
the question of whether or not there had been a "practical acceptance" by the State of Utah of the AppellantContractor's work on the drainage ditch and fence may
well have been (and should have been) a question of
law to be decided by the court, as it was in the cases
cited by counsel for the Appellant^Contractor, especially
in light of the facts in the case at bar.
The court further recognized for the first time (because it had failed to hear the law earlier) that even if
the question of whether or not there had been a "practical acceptance" of the Appellant-Contractor's work by
the State of Utah was one that should be decided by the
jury, since the court had failed to advise the jury by instruction what acts would constitute a "practical acceptance", it could not expect that any real consideration
would be given by the jury as to whether there had been
a "practical acceptance" by the State of Utah of the
Appellant-Contractor's work.
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Thus, it is clear that the jury decided the subject
case, not on the basis of whether or not there had been
a "practical acceptance" by the State of Utah of the
Appellant-Contractor's work on the drainage ditch and
fence, but simply on the basis of whether or not the
Plaintiff-Respondent's bull and cow got out under the
fence through the drainage ditch.
It is not difficult to conceive that the court compounded its error in refusing to grant Appellant-Contractor's Motion for Directed Verdict which it had taken
under advisement because the court was reluctant to
overturn the jury verdict. Notwithstanding the court's
commitment to counsel for the Appellant-Contractor to
"ultimately hear you out on the law", the court decided
the Motion for a Directed Verdict which was joined with
a Motion for a New Trial, or in the Alternative, Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, without any further
oral argument on the matter.
It is submitted that the court erred in submitting
the question of whether or not there had been a "practical acceptance" by the State of Utah of the AppellantContractor's work and compounded that error after submitting the question by not informing the jury as to
what constitutes a "practical acceptance".
CONCLUSION
The Judgment entered in the trial court with respect
to the Second Cause of Action for One Thousand Nine
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Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($1,900.00), plus costs for
damages caused Plaintiff-Respondent for the loss of his
Charlois bull and Hereford cow should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
MORGAN, SCALLEY,
LUNT & KESLER
STEPHEN G. MORGAN
Attorney for
Defendant and Appellant
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